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La economía internacional ha vivido significativos acontecimientos durante los últimos años: la 
creciente importancia de los países asiáticos en el comercio global; la crisis financiera de 2007-08, 
la gran recesión en EE.UU. y su propagación al resto del mundo; el agudo aumento y posterior 
caída del precio de las materias primas en el período 2006-2009. En este trabajo desarrollamos un 
modelo dinámico y estocástico de equilibrio general para la economía global descompuesta en 
varias regiones. Este modelo constituye un marco conceptual simple para entender los sucesos 
recientes de la economía global y su propagación al resto del mundo, dado que está equipado para 
ofrecer una determinación conjunta de los tipos de cambio, las balanzas comerciales y los precios 
de las materias primas básicas (petróleo y cobre). Realizamos varias simulaciones con el modelo. 
Primero, consideramos la desaceleración de EE.UU. y su transmisión internacional. Segundo, 
exploramos un ciclo de auge-caída a nivel global generado por perspectivas excesivamente 
optimistas de la productividad y su relación con los desbalances globales. Finalmente, analizamos 
las consecuencias económicas globales de políticas proteccionistas. Encontramos que los efectos en 
los precios de las materias primas, la actividad y la demanda global derivados de estas simulaciones 
tienden a amplificarse si los tipos de cambio reales y los salarios reales tienen un ajuste más lento 
en algunas de las regiones. 
 
Abstract  
The global economy has experienced several significant developments during the recent years: the 
rising role of giant Asian economies in international trade; the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing 
Great Recession in the US, with its propagation to the rest of the world; the sharp rise and 
subsequent burst of commodity prices over 2006-2009. In this paper we use a multi-region DSGE 
model for the global economy as a simple framework to understand the global response to these 
shocks and the importance of the propagation to different regions. The model is equipped to jointly 
determine exchange rates, trade balances and commodity prices across the world. We carry out 
several simulations with the model. First, we consider the US slowdown and its international 
propagation. Second, we explore a global boom-bust cycle driven by overoptimistic forecasts for 
productivity and their relationship with current account rebalancing. Finally, we analyze the global 
economic consequences of protectionism. We find that the effects in commodity prices, global 
output and demand tend to be amplified if the real exchange rates and real wages are more sluggish 
to adjust in some regions. 
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The past few years have witnessed both the emergence of signiﬁcant tensions as well as the
continuation of trends in the global economy. On the one hand, the ﬁnancial systems in the
most advanced economies have been severely shaken, due to the bursting of the housing bubble
at the end of 2007 and its aftershocks most notably in the United States and other Anglo-Saxon
economies, leading to the most severe global slowdown in economic activity since the Great
Depression. On the other hand, these very negative developments have occurred against the
backdrop of sustained globalization and some resilience in growth in large emerging economies.
Some other areas, historically prone to ﬁnancial contagion, such as Latin America, also have
shown a less damaging impact than in previous moments of large economic crisis in the world.
Hence, some economies have been able to keep growing, while others have faced the global
ﬁnancial turbulence from a more robust economic standpoint. Although this global picture
dissipated over the last part of 2008, as most economies suﬀered a coordinated bust in demand
and output, the recent performance of big emerging economies and the recovery of commodity
prices seems to have given a new twist to the decoupling hypothesis.
On the other hand, the recent behavior in housing market in the US and elsewhere have
renewed the interest on how changes in the expectation about the future can explain business
cycles and asset prices bubbles. Although this situation was originated in the US, globalization
in good and ﬁnancial markets has helped propagated this US boom-bust cycle to the rest of
world. Thus, commodity prices experienced a signiﬁcant surge during the period 2006-2008,
but a sharp bust at the end of 2008 that apparently can not only be attributed to ﬂuctuations in
their supply. Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2007) have argued that stock market ﬂuctuations and
business cycles can be explained signiﬁcantly by expected anticipated changes in productivity.
Christiano et al. (2007) have adapted this mechanism to generate cycles that are triggered
by expected changes in future productivity that do not materialize ex-post in the context of a
closed economy as a way to explain the recent episode in US.
The recent boom and bust of the global economy have also aﬀected the support for glob-
alization and free-trade policies. Many countries have enacted measures that seem against
free-trade principles. For example, France launched a state fund to protect French companies
from foreign takeovers. The funds provided by the US government to General Motors and
Chrysler could be considered as trade-distorting policies.
Thus, several stylized facts and open questions of the global economy suggest the need
for a multi-country model of the world. First, the trade and economic inter-linkages between
economic zones give rise naturally to feedback eﬀects of shocks to speciﬁc zones of the world.
Second, the existence of independent monetary policies gives rise to ﬁnancial inter-linkages
1across economic zones, thanks to the impact of diﬀerent monetary policy paths on exchange
rates and hence one the short-run dynamics of demand and production. Third, and coupled
with the second point, the geographically concentrated supply of non-renewable commodities,
such as oil and metals, implies that the external accounts of these economic areas will be an
important channel of transmission of international shocks.
This paper presents a simple DSGE model of the global economy that can tackle these very
diﬀerent questions from a coherent perspective. Our model is build in line with the recent
literature on New Open Macroeconomics and closely related to Elekdag et al. (2008), Erceg
et al. (2006), Faruqee et al. (2005). As in these works, we consider a multi-region setting
for modelling the global economy and we assume the presence of nominal rigidity, so that
monetary policy in each region has a non-trivial role. In particular, we consider four economic
regions: The US, the euro area plus Japan (EU), emerging Asia (AS) and the rest of the world
(RW). Each region produces a distinctive tradable good. The multi-region context considers
explicitly the trade ﬂows and relative prices among regions, including the exchange rate. The
model introduces nominal rigidities in prices and wages, implying Phillips curves for nominal
prices and wages in each region. We include commodities as inputs in the production function
available in each region. This allows us to have an endogenous behavior for commodity prices.
A distinctive ingredient of our model is that explicitly considers oil and copper as two diﬀerent
commodity goods needed in the gross production of each regions. Consistent with the data, we
assume that commodity endowments are mainly concentrated in the rest of the world (RW).
We use our global model to analyze (i) the international transmission of the US slowdown;
(ii) a boom-bust cycle driven by overoptimistic perspectives for productivity; and (iii) the
economic consequences of protectionism.
When the US slowdown is driven by a contraction in aggregate demand, we would observe
a decline in global inﬂation and commodity prices combined with a GDP reduction of the other
regions. However, when the US slowdown is originated by a fall in its productivity, the global
economy can decouple from the US downturn phase in the short-run because the global demand
is maintained with a increase in the share in global production of emerging Asia and the rest
of the world. Moreover, this case implies a rise in inﬂation and commodity prices across the
world since emerging Asia production is relative more intensive in commodity than US. Also,
when emerging Asia and net commodity exporters peg to the US dollar we can observe higher
commodity prices and an initial decoupling of these economies even in the case of a fall in US
demand. This is due to the fact that the real appreciation required in emerging Asia and net
commodity exporters is limited, which allows them to sustain its foreign demand and implies
that commodity prices helps to make the adjustment in relative prices.
2Overoptimistic expectations about future productivity increased productivity in the future
that turns out to be false ex-post can generate a boom-bust cycle in world output and com-
modity prices. An ampliﬁcation of this boom-bust cycle results if AS and RW stabilize their
currencies or US and EU have more rigid real wages since a limitation in the adjustment of
relative prices (e.g., real exchange rates, real wages) would generate more eﬀects in the real
quantities.
When US and EU apply protectionist policies that imply subsidies to domestic production,
we observe a rise in output of these regions without aﬀecting much the other regions’ outputs
and global trade ﬂows among regions. In this case, we would observe a rise in commodity prices.
However, this type of policy generates a ﬁscal deﬁcit. On the other hand, if US and EU were to
impose import tariﬀs to keep their ﬁscal accounts balanced, the reduction in trade ﬂows would
be signiﬁcant, reducing mainly the output in AS. Moreover, in this last case, output in US and
EU would be reduced as well due to the fall in foreign demand generated through increases in
their domestic prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the structure
of the model. Section 3 discusses the parameter choices for the base calibration of the model.
Section 4 shows the results of simulating a US slowdown. Section 5 analyzes a global boom-bust
cycle focused in US while section 6 explores the consequences of protectionist policies in US
and EU. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Model for the Global Economy
The structure of the model is based on the literature in New Open Economy Macroeconomics,
which analyzes international variables based on microeconomics foundations combined with
real and nominal rigidities. As mention previously, our model is closely related to Elekdag et
al. (2008), Erceg et al. (2006), and Faruqee et al. (2005). An innovation of our model is the
explicit inclusion of not only oil, but also copper as inputs in production. In this section, we
provide a synthetic overview of the model.1
The global economy consists of four regions: United States (US), Euro Area (EU), emerging
Asia (AS), and the rest of world (RW). In each region there are ﬁrms, households and a
monetary authority. Firms produce intermediate goods and ﬁnal tradable goods. In order to
obtain an endogenous behavior for commodity prices, we include them (e.g. oil and copper)
as inputs in the production function of ﬁrms. The supply of commodities is assumed to be
ﬁxed and concentrated in the rest of the world (RW). Households in each region take decisions
1A detailed version of the model is available in Medina (2009).
3on consumption, savings and labor supply. We assume the presence of nominal rigidities in
prices and wages in each region, which implies that the dynamics of price and wage inﬂation
are captured by New Keynesian Phillips curves. Monetary policy in each region is modelled as
a Taylor type rule.
Firms producing intermediate goods use labor, capital, oil and copper as inputs. For
simplicity, we assume that the capital stock in each region is constant. Thus, a log-linear
approximation for the production function of this type of ﬁrms in region i is:
b yi,t = b ai,t + αi,lb li,t + αi,ob yO,i,t + αi,sb ys,i,t
where b ai,t, b li,t, b yO,i,t, and b yS,i,t are the level of productivity, labor, the amount of oil and copper
used for the production of goods b yi,t in region i. Parameters αi,l, αi,o and αi,s are the production
shares of each input. We will assume that both oil and copper are complements of labor in
production. Hence, the elasticity of substitution among commodities and labor is lower than
one.
Households consume a composite basket that consists of tradable goods produced in each re-
gion. Since we exclude government consumption and investment, total household consumption
represents the aggregate demand of each region. A log-linear approximation of the consumption
basket of region i can be expressed as:
b ci,t = γi,usb ci,t(us) + γi,eub ci,t(eu) + γi,asb ci,t(as) + γi,rwb ci,t(rw)
where b ci,t(j) is the consumption of region i of goods produced in region j. γi,j is the share of
goods of region j in the consumption basket of region i. Households in region i will minimize
the cost of their consumption basket, which delivers the demand for each type of goods (in a
log-linear form):
b ci,t(j) = b ci,t − ηi,j (b pi,t(j) − b pc,i,t)
where b pi,t(j) is the price of goods produced in region j and consumed in region i (and in the
currency of region i) and b pc,i,t is the price level of the consumption basket in region i. Also,
ηi,j is the elasticity of substitution of goods produced in region j in the consumption basket of
region i. These elasticities determine the degree of sensitivity of the demand for each type of
goods to changes in relative prices and, therefore, they are key to the adjustment of net exports
to ﬂuctuations in exchange rates. The price level of the consumption basket of region i can be
written as:
b pc,i,t = γi,usb pi,t(us) + γi,eub pi,t(eu) + γi,asb pi,t(as) + γi,rwb pi,t(rw) .
In price setting, we allow for the possibility of a complete or incomplete exchange rate
pass-through to import prices in the short run. In the simple framework adopted here, the
4exchange rate pass-through depends on the currency of denomination of the prices of goods
produced and exported from one region to another. For example, if producers of region j sell
their goods in region i in US dollars, we will have that b pi,t(j) = b pus$
j,t +b ei,t, where b pus$
j,t is the
US dollar price set by the producers of goods in region j and b ei,t is the value of the currency
of region i in terms of the US dollar.2
In each region, there are two types of households. One type of household is forward-looking
and optimizing. The other households are ﬁnancially constrained and do not hold any assets.
The latter type of households represents a fraction λi of the total households in region i and
their consumption (b cR
i ) is equal to their disposable labor income:
b cR
i,t = b wR
i,t − pc,i,t +b lR
i,t
where b wR
i,t and b lR
i,t are the wages and the labor supply of constrained households.
In contrast, forward-looking and optimizing households maximize their utility function sub-
ject to their intertemporal budget constraint. This type of households owns the ﬁrms and holds
two types of bonds. One of these bonds is traded domestically in each region and is denomi-
nated in local currency. The other type of bonds is denominated in US dollars and is traded
internationally with a zero net supply worldwide. As usual, the optimal path of consumption



























σiEt [ζC,i,t − ζC,i,t+1]
where b cO
i,t is the consumption of forward-looking households in region i, c Rni,t is the nominal
interest rate in region i, b πc,i,t is the price level inﬂation of the consumption basket in region
i, and ζC,i,t is a demand shock that shifts the consumption of forward looking households. As
usual, Et [·] denotes the expectation conditional on the information at period t. Parameters
σi and hi are the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the degree of habit formation in
consumption. This last element induces a more sluggish behavior of private demand, which
is coherent with observed dynamics at the aggregate level. Portfolio decisions by forward
looking households for domestic and international bonds give rise to a no-arbitrage condition
between foreign and domestic interest rates. In other words, the uncovered interest parity (UIP)
condition is satisﬁed:
c Rni,t = b R∗
t + Et [∆ei,t+1] + ρi,t
2See Table 6 in appendix B for the calibration used to the share of exports of each region denominated in
diﬀerent currencies.
5where b R∗
t is the US interest rate, ∆ei,t is the nominal depreciation of region i relative to the
US dollar, and ρi,t is a risk premium.3
Firms producing tradable goods in region i face nominal rigidities when setting their prices.
In each period only a fraction of these ﬁrms are able to adjust optimally their prices. The
optimal rule implies that prices are based on the expected path of marginal costs. Those
ﬁrms that are unable to adjust optimally their prices set them based on a weighted average of
past inﬂation and inﬂation target, adjusting their level of production to satisfy their demand.
Aggregating price decisions across ﬁrms, we are able to obtain a hybrid New Phillips curve
that relates the path of inﬂation to marginal costs, expected inﬂation and past inﬂation:
b πi,t = υ1,iEt[b πi,t+1] + υ2,ib πi,t−1 + κi (c mci,t − b pi,t + ζi,p,t)
where b πi,t is the rate of domestic inﬂation, c mci,t are the marginal costs, b pi,t is the price level of
tradable goods produced in region i and ζi,p,t is an exogenous cost-push shock. υ1,i, υ2,i and κi
are constants that depend on parameters that determine the degree of nominal rigidities and
price indexation.
Analogously, the wage setting process also faces nominal rigidities. In each period only a
fraction of optimizing forward-looking households are able to set optimally their wages. Those
households that cannot adjust their wages optimally set them based on past inﬂation, the
inﬂation target and the labor productivity trend. Constrained households set their wages equal
to the average wage of optimizing households. Aggregating across optimizing forward-looking
households, a log-linear expression for labor supply decision is:




i,t − b wi,t + b pc,i,t

+ δi,1Et [∆b wi,t+1] + δi,2 [b πc,i,t−1 − βb πc,i,t] .
Constants ϕw,i, δi,1, δi,2 are parameters that depend on the degree of nominal rigidity and
indexation of wages and the elasticity of the labor supply. d mrs
O
i,t is the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption for the optimizing forward-looking households
in region i.
Finally, monetary policy in region i is modelled through a Taylor type rule that reacts to
aggregate GDP, CPI inﬂation and (potentially) to the depreciation of the nominal domestic
currency vis-` a-vis the US dollar:
c Rni,t = ψi,Rn c Rni,t−1 + (1 − ψi,Rn)(ψi,yc vai,t + ψi,πb πc,i,t + ψi,∆e∆b ei,t) .
3This premium depends on the total net asset position of each region in a very elastic manner. This device
is introduced in the model to obtain well deﬁned dynamics around steady state. See Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(2003) for diﬀerent ways to get steady state independent of initial conditions for small open economy models.
6c vai,t is GDP of region i as a deviation of its balanced growth path. Parameter ψi,Rn is the
degree of smoothing of the monetary policy rule, while ψi,y, ψi,π, and ψi,∆e determine the
intensity with which monetary policy reacts to GDP, inﬂation, and exchange rate depreciation,
respectively.
3 Model Parametrization
In this section we describe our choices for the parameters used to solve the model numerically.
In general, we use values for the parameters that are consistent with relevant statistics in the
data and line with those chosen in other works that develop multi-country general equilibrium
models (see, among others, Faruqee et al. (2005), Elekdag et al. (2008), Batini et al. (2007),
Erceg et al. (2006))). In table 1 in appendix A, we present statistics for the four regions:
United States (US), Europe (EU), Asia (AS), and Rest of World (RW). 4
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 in appendix B show values for the parameters used for the base
calibration. In the production function of each region we assume that the oil share is 3%
for US, EU and RW, and 6.0% for AS. These ﬁgures are coherent with other studies. For
example, Blanchard and Gali (2007) estimates an oil share between 1 and 3% for US data.
Sanchez (2008) obtain an oil share close to 3% for euro area countries for the year 2000. Our
calibration is also coherent with the notion that emerging Asia uses oil in production more
intensively. Labor share is the most relevant variable factor of production in each region,
assuming that its use is relatively more intensive in AS. The parameter governing the degree of
substitution between oil and the other factors of production in region i is denoted by θi,o, while
the one for the substitution between copper and the other factors is θi,s. These parameters are
set to remark the low degree of substitution between commodities and the rest of factors in
production. Regarding household preferences, we consider that the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is equal to 1.0 and set the coeﬃcient of habit formation in consumption at 0.8 for
all regions. Consistently with the degree of openness of each region, we assume that the shares
of domestic goods in the total consumption basket are high, in a range between 90% (for US)
and 81% (for RW).
We do not consider important diﬀerences in the degree of nominal rigidities among regions.
We assume the Calvo probabilities of optimally setting prices and wages are equal to 0.33 and
0.25, for all regions. These values imply that nominal prices in average adjust optimally every
4These regions do not coincide directly with our classiﬁcation of regions used in the model. Hence, these
ﬁgures are considered as information for our calibration in a broad sense and are not used strictly. For instance,
Asia in this data includes not only emerging economies but also Japan.
7two quarters, while wages do so every four quarters. The degree of smoothing of the monetary
policy rules is calibrated at 0.8 for all regions. The reaction coeﬃcient of monetary policy to
CPI inﬂation is slightly diﬀerent across regions, with a value of 2.0 for US and EU, and a value
of 1.2 for AS and RW.5
Finally, we assume that relative sizes in terms of GDP are 30% for US and EU, 25% for
RW and 15% for AS. The steady-state trade statistics assume that net exports represent 0.6%
of GDP in US, and between -0.2% and -0.4% in the other regions. These ﬁgures are coherent
with the notion that US is a net debtor in the steady state while the other regions are net
lenders.6 Regarding the trade ﬂows of ﬁnal goods, we consider that in steady-state the US
exports as percentage of its GDP is 13.2%, which is divided into 5.7% to RW, 5.0% to EU and
2.5% to AS. In the case of EU, exports of ﬁnal goods as a percentage of its GDP is 13.1%, of
which 4.0% goes to US, 4.1% to AS and 5.0% to RW. AS is relatively more open in the trade of
ﬁnal goods, with exports of ﬁnal goods explaining 25.1% of its GDP. This ﬁgure is divided into
9.9% to US, 10.8% to EU and 4.4% to RW. Final goods of RW exported to US, EU and AS
represent, respectively, 1.2%, 3.0% and 3.2% of its GDP. The net exports of oil as a percentage
of each region’s GDP are -2.5% for US and EU, and -6.4% for AS. For RW this ratio is equal to
10%. The net export of copper represents a 0.5% of its GDP in RW, while this ratio is -0.1%
for US and EU, and -0.4% for AS. Consistent with trade ﬂows in steady-state, the net foreign
asset position as a percentage of the GDP of each region are -60% for US, 20% for EU, 40%
for AS, and 24% for RW.
In the next sections we use the global model as a laboratory to explore the eﬀects and mech-
anisms behind several types of economics shocks that have been part of the recent international
discussion.
4 U.S. Slowdown and its International Propagation
In this section we analyze the response of the international economy –represented in the four
regions of the model– to a United States (US) slowdown. We also explore its eﬀects in com-
modity prices. First, using the base calibration of the model, we consider two sources for the
US slowdown. One is caused by a reduction in private demand in US and the other by a fall in
the productivity of the US. Second, we consider the impact of this US slowdown with an alter-
5Alternative calibrations for the monetary policy rules are considered to analyze how diﬀerent monetary
reactions can aﬀect the international transmission of shocks. In particular, we will consider a case where AS
and RW aim at stabilizing their exchange rate ﬂuctuations. This would generate more expansionary monetary
policies in AS and RW in response to shocks that tend to appreciate their currencies.
6See Elekdag et al. (2008).
8native calibration where Emerging Asia (AS) and the Rest of World (RW) follow a monetary
regime that tends to stabilize their exchange rates.
4.1 U.S. Slowdown: Demand vs. Supply Factors
Reduction in U.S. Demand
A US slowdown generated by a fall in the private demand is shown in ﬁgure 1. The size of
the shock is calibrated in order to obtain a maximum decline in US GDP about 1.5%. This
shock reduces the demand in US for goods produced domestically and for imports. As results,
the CPI inﬂation in US declines, reaching a maximum decline slightly larger than 2.5% after
one year and a half (6 quarters). The US nominal interest rate falls smoothly until reaching
about 400 basis points below the baseline. The fall of US imports favors an improvement of
close to 2% of GDP in its trade balance.
The cuts in the US nominal interest rate depreciates the US dollar about 4% against the
currencies of the other regions. Thus, the improvement in the US trade balance has as a
counterpart a fall in the next exports as percentage of GDP in regions AS, EU and RW, within
a range between 0.5% and 1.0%.
The decline in US demand is transmitted to the other regions, reducing their total outputs.
The propagating dynamics are heterogenous among regions and depend crucially on the degree
of trade integration of each region with US. Also, this transmission hinges on the currency
of denomination of export prices of each region to US and to the other regions as well. For
instance, given that EU sets the price of its exports in its own currency, the impact of the
appreciation of its currency with respect to the US dollar is passed instantaneously into a
contraction in the exported volumes of this region to US. This implies an initial fall of 0.5% in
EU output. The appreciation in region EU together with the fall in external demand induces
a fall in CPI inﬂation of 0.8% after four quarters.
Despite that exports of AS to US are greater than those of EU to US, we observe a fall in AS
output similar to the one observed in EU. This occurs because we have assumed that the prices
of exports of region AS to US are denominated in US dollars, such that the appreciation of its
currency in AS is absorbed initially by the margins of producers in AS. Over time, producers
in AS pass part of the appreciation currency to the US dollar price of goods exported to US
and the other regions. This explains a fall in AS output that is larger than in EU after some
quarters. During the ﬁrst year after the shock, we observe a reduction of CPI inﬂation in AS
that is close to 2% while the nominal interest rate falls about 200 basis points. The rest of
the World (RW) —that is a net commodities exporter— shows similar declines in inﬂation and
9nominal interest rates, but the fall in its output is smaller than in AS since its ﬁnal goods
exported to US represent a low fraction of its total production.
As expected, the fall in the output of each region contributes to a decline in the demand for
commodities, which shifts down the price of oil and copper by about 5% and 10%, respectively.
This fall in commodity prices also favors an improvement in the net exports of US vis-` a-vis
those of RW, that is a net exporter of commodities.
Reduction in U.S. Productivity
When the slowdown in US is originate in a reduction in productivity, the eﬀects on the
global economy are subtly diﬀerent. In ﬁgure 2 we show the responses of the international
variables after a fall in US productivity that reduces its total output about 1.5%, the same
amount as in the latter case. The decline in US productivity pushes the marginal cost up and,
therefore, inﬂation in US accelerates until reaching an increase of 1.5% about one year after the
shock. This, in turn, implies an increase in the US interest rate of a similar magnitude. Since
the US demand adjusts slowly to a lower income, we do not observe an initial improvement in
the trade balance. Later, the trade balance increases, but in a more limited way and in a more
sluggish manner than in the case of a demand contraction. Net exports as percentage of GDP
rise about 0.2% after almost two years.
The decline in US productivity generates a depreciation on impact of 0.5% of the currencies
of the other regions with respect to the US dollar. Thus, we observe a more muted fall in the
trade balance of the other regions than in the case of a demand contraction. However, more
inﬂation in US is transmitted to the other regions, generating a rise in the CPI inﬂation of the
other regions in a range between 0.2% and 1% after one year. Given the rise in CPI inﬂation
in the other regions, monetary policy in each region modelled as a Taylor type rule dictates a
rise in the interest rate.
It is worth noting that this type of contraction in US generates an increase in the price of
commodities, oil and copper. These responses of commodity prices contribute to the rise of
inﬂation in all regions and partly reduces the adjustment in net exports in US vis-` a-vis the net
exporters of commodities (RW).
The explanation for these commodity price dynamics lie in the fact that the fall in US
productivity generates incentives to move factors and resources from US to the rest of the
global economy and, in particular, to AS. Since AS production of ﬁnal goods is relatively more
intensive in commodities than US production, in equilibrium, the rise in AS production relative
to the US production requires an increase in commodity prices. This rise in commodity prices
10generates a slight expansion in output in the region that is a net exporter of commodities (RW).
In summary, a US slowdown caused by a reduction in productivity is able to generate an
international decoupling of RW, with relatively muted reductions in the output of EU and AS.
Moreover, this case reﬂects a more limited adjustment in the global imbalances with additional
increases in commodity prices and a rise in international inﬂation. Therefore, this type of shock
was better equipped to explain the international economic outlook during most of 2008 where
the United States was decelerating with smaller consequences in the global economy and new
increases in commodity prices together with higher prospects for inﬂation across the world.
4.2 Exchange rate stabilization in AS and RW
During the 2000s many emerging economies have applied policies aimed to sustain export
competitiveness. In many cases, this has been translated into stabilizing the value of the
exchange rate, which has required low interest rates in emerging economies when there are
forces to drive up the value of their currencies up. China and oil exporters are clear examples
of this behavior. As we observe in the last subsection, a US slowdown requires an appreciation
of the currencies in AS and RW. Thus, if AS and RW try to avoid the appreciation of their
currencies, monetary policy would be forced to lower interest rates. To explore the consequences
of this, we analyze the responses of the international economy to the same shocks, but with
an alternative speciﬁcation for the monetary policies in AS and RW that tend to remove the
variations in the US dollar of their currencies in a systematic way.7
Figure 3 shows the impact of a US slowdown driven by a fall in demand in the base
calibration and the alternative speciﬁcation where AS and RW stabilize their exchange rates
against the US dollar. Interestingly, the behavior of monetary policy in AS and RW allows
them to decouple in the short run from the US slowdown. However, the US suﬀers a bigger
downturn than in the baseline case. The increase in the US trade balance is smaller than in
the base calibration while the fall in the trade balance is slower in AS and RW. EU absorbs
more intensively the reduction in US demand and the contraction in output and trade balance
is higher than in the base case.
Similarly, ﬁgure 4 presents the US slowdown driven by a fall in productivity when AS and
RW stabilize their exchange rates against the US dollar. The contraction in US GDP is bigger
than in the base calibration. Emerging Asia and the rest of the world experience a slightly
higher real depreciation of their currencies with a signiﬁcant increase in domestic inﬂation.
Commodity prices rise more than in the base case and US also faces higher inﬂation.
7Formally, we set monetary policy in these two regions such that ψAS,∆b e = ψRW,∆b e = 10.
115 The Global Boom-Bust Cycle and Current Account Imbal-
ances
The boom-bust cycle experienced recently by the U.S. has renewed several questions regarding
how changes in expectations may be an important ingredient of economic ﬂuctuations.8 In
addition, particular attention has been given to the factors that can amplify these episodes as
structural elements and monetary policy. Moreover, the boom-bust cycle in the US seems to
translate to the rest of the global economy and to the behavior of the commodity prices. In
this section, we use the perspective suggested by Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2007), adapted
by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006, 2007), and Christiano et al. (2007) to analyze this kind of
economic ﬂuctuations. The mechanism is that the boom phase is driven by a signal about an
improvement in productivity in the future. Eventually this signal turns out to be false and the
bust phase of the cycle begins.
To implement this possibility in our model, we assume that productivity in block i is
governed by the following stationary process:
b ai,t = ρaiai,t−1 + ζai,t−p + εai,t i = US,EU,AS,RW





are i.i.d. innovations. The variable ζai,t−p is a shock to the expected
future productivity level p periods ahead and is uncorrelated with εai,t. This shock captures
the idea that signals to the future level of productivity are received over time. An observation
of this shock in t makes private agents expect that productivity p periods ahead will be given
by
Et [ai,t+p] = ρp
aiai,t + ζai,t
where ζai,t > 0. At time t + p agents learn that the productivity level did change by less than
expected. For that, we introduce a shock εai,t+p < 0 on productivity at t + p.
Figure 5 shows this exercise under the base calibration. We simulate a case where the most
favorable prospects for productivity are more intense in US, followed by the EU and ﬁnally
in AS and RW (ζaUS > ζaEU > ζaAS = ζaRW) when the signal is received eight quarters in
advance (p = 8).9 Although the economies do not increase their productivity level during the
ﬁrst two years, the signal about a future increase in it is generating a boom phase in all regions
with peaks in outputs within a range between 2 and 4%. Aggregate demand rises more than
current income in US, EU and AS, implying a reduction in the trade balance in these regions
8See Beaudry and Portier, 2004, 2007; Christiano et al., 2007; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2008, among recent
studies
9We also assume that ρai = 0.99 for all i.
12between 1 and 3%. The rest of the world, being a net exporter of commodities, runs a positive
trade balance as commodity prices rise in response to the boom in global demand. Since the
optimistic perspectives for productivity are higher in the US than in the other regions, their
currencies depreciate in real terms against the dollar in the boom phase.
Christiano et al. (2007) argue that this type of news shocks pull inﬂation down in the
boom phase as the Phillips Curve of domestic prices is determined by the expected path of
the marginal cost. Thus, an expected future increase in productivity reduces the marginal cost
in the future, and through that channel inﬂation falls. In a small open economy version of
that type of model, Marf´ an et al. (2008) obtain similarly a fall in inﬂation not only due to
the expected reduction in marginal cost but also due to the appreciation of the currency. In
the present simulation, however, we observe a rise in CPI inﬂation in US and EU in the boom
phase. The increase in commodity prices helps to explain the initial increase in inﬂation in the
boom phase in US and EU. The other factor that explains the behavior of inﬂation in US and
EU is the fact that exports to US and EU are denominated in US dollars and EU currency.
Thus, any appreciation in US and EU against a bilateral trade partner is transmitted slowly
to CPI inﬂation. For that reason, we observe a reduction in CPI inﬂation in AS and RW.
When private agents realize that the signal about productivity increase turned out to be
false, the global economy experiences a sharp downturn, pushing for a reversal in the trade
balances in each region. The commodity prices burst and inﬂation in all regions is reduced.
Later, as the marginal cost turns to be higher than expected, CPI inﬂation rises even in the
presence of a protracted fall in commodity prices.
As the previous section showed, the exchange rate policy in AS and RW can be critical to
the international adjustment. Figure 6 presents the same exercise under the case where AS and
RW peg to the US dollar. Interestingly, this type of policies changes signiﬁcantly the response
of inﬂation in AS and RW. Under exchange rate stabilization in AS and RW, their inﬂation
paths are higher in the boom phase. We also see a marginal ampliﬁcation in the boom-bust
cycle of commodity prices and trade balance adjustments. The peaks in output expansion
of AS and RW are also higher. It is worth noting that there is no important change in the
dynamics in output and inﬂation in US and EU. Thus, the exchange rate inﬂexibility in the
emerging economies (AS and RW) can amplify a boom-bust cycle in commodity prices and in
output and inﬂation in the emerging economies.
Christiano et al. (2007) have noted that a boom-bust cycle can be potentially exacerbated
if the nominal wages are rigid in the short run and monetary policy follows a stricter inﬂation
targeting regime. The combination of these two features, when nominal wages are not indexed
automatically to past inﬂation, induces a signiﬁcant real wage rigidity which, in turn, ampliﬁes
13the boom-bust cycle. To explore this possibility of more wage rigidity in US and EU, we consider
an alternative calibration where the weight of inﬂation in the Taylor-type rule increases and
the indexation to past inﬂation of wages is ﬁxed at zero in both US and EU.10 Figure 7 shows
the responses to the same boom-bust cycle in the case where AS and RW peg to the US dollar
and with more rigidity in real wages in US and EU. This feature ampliﬁes the boom-bust cycle
in commodity prices and in the output of US and EU. Also, the inﬂation path of AS and RW
is higher in the boom phase. As expected, inﬂation increases in US and EU are smaller in the
boom phase when real wages are more rigid in these regions.
As we have seen, a boom-bust cycle can partly explain current account imbalances, but it
is unable to predict a trade surplus in emerging Asia. In ﬁgure 8 we show a simulation where
we add an appetite for saving in AS and loose monetary policy in AS and RW to complement
the boom-bust cycle pattern in the base calibration. This last element helps to generate a
surplus in the trade balance of emerging Asia. It is worth noting that the reversal in the US
trade balance does not need a sizeable depreciation of the US dollar against EU and AS. The
real depreciation of US against the net exporter of commodities is bigger. The reduction in
commodity prices helps to attenuate the need for an important adjustment in the real exchange
rate of US.
6 The Eﬀects of Protectionism
During the economic expansion of the period 2003-2007, there was widespread support for
globalization and cross-border trade. However, since the downturn hit, the faith in free-trade
policies seems to be under test. This situation is not particular to this recent period. After
the great depression of the 1930s, several countries implemented policies that limited trade
in goods. Although leaders of industrialized economies have issued a pledge to refrain from
protectionist policies, many countries have enacted measures that seem to go against free-
trade principles. Moreover, some observers have warned that these anti-trade measures could
grow into a broader wave of protectionism. In this section, we use our model to analyze the
consequences of protectionist policies in US and EU.
In ﬁgure 9 we show the responses of placing subsidies in US and EU as a protectionist
policy. These subsidies are assumed to be transitory but very persistent and cause on impact
a 2% reduction in the cost of domestic production. Both US and EU experience an increase in
output of about 1% while their trade surplus does not adjust much. AS and RW reduce their
outputs marginally. We observe a rise in commodity prices that helps explain the positive trade
10For the Taylor-type rule, we increase ψπ in US and EU from 2.0 to 4.0.
14surplus in RW and the reduction in net exports of AS. Although commodity prices increase, CPI
inﬂation falls across the globe, and not only in the US and EU. Imposing a subsidy generates
an income eﬀect that increases the demand for all goods, including imports. For that reason,
the trade balance in each region does not change much and a measure of global imports –a
weighted average of the imports of all regions– does not fall.
The application of only subsidies generates a ﬁnancing problem in the ﬁscal side. A more
realistic case would complement subsidies with import tariﬀs in order to keep the ﬁscal accounts
balanced in the medium term. Figure 10 presents the dynamics when the subsidies in US and
EU are complemented with import tariﬀs after two quarters in order to keep the ﬁscal accounts
balanced. The presence of import tariﬀs in US and EU induces a reduction of 10% in global
imports. Emerging Asia, being very open in its trade linkages with US and EU, is the region
that suﬀers the most from the import tariﬀs in terms of output, reducing its GDP in a range
between 2 and 3%. Output in US and EU falls about 1% as a consequences of the import tariﬀs
imposed. The initial fall in inﬂation in US and EU derived from the subsidies is followed by
an increase despite the fall in commodity prices. Although tariﬀs in US and EU reduce their
imports, the trade balance in these two regions does not increase as the increase in the prices
of their domestic production disincentives foreign demand for their exports.
7 Final Comments
The model presented here oﬀers a conceptual framework to understand the interaction among
regions in the international economy and the behavior of the prices of commodities from a
general equilibrium perspective. Simulations of the models are used to explore the global
consequences of a U.S. slowdown, a global boom-bust cycle and protectionist policies in the
industrialized economies.
When the US slowdown is driven by a contraction in aggregate demand, we observe a
decline in global inﬂation and commodity prices combined with a reduction in the GDP of the
other regions. However, when the US slowdown is originated by a fall in its productivity, the
global economy can decouple from the US downturn cycle in the short run. Moreover, this case
implies a rise in inﬂation and commodity prices across the world. Also, when emerging Asia
and net commodity exporters peg to the US dollar we can observe higher commodity prices
and an initial decoupling of these economies even in the case of a fall in US demand.
An overoptimistic expectation of increase in productivity in the future that turns to be false
ex post can generate a boom-bust cycle in outputs and commodity prices. An ampliﬁcation
of this boom-bust cycle can be derived if AS and RW stabilize their currencies or US and EU
15have more rigid real wages.
When US and EU apply protectionist policies that imply subsidies in domestic production,
we observe a rise in output of these regions without aﬀecting the other regions’ outputs and
the trade ﬂows among regions much. In this case, we would observe a rise in commodity prices.
However, this type of policy generates a deﬁcit on the ﬁscal side. To remove this problem, if
US and EU impose an import tariﬀ that keeps their ﬁscal account balanced, the reduction in
trade ﬂows would be signiﬁcant, reducing mainly output in AS. Moreover, in this last case,
output in US and EU would fall as well due to the reduction in foreign demand that generated
the increases in domestic prices of US and EU.
References
[1] Batini, N., Cova, M. Pisani, and A. Rebucci (2007): “Productivity and Global Imbalances:
The Role of Non-Tradable TFP in Advanced Economies,” mimeo, International Monetary
Fund.
[2] Beaudry, P. and F. Portier (2004) “An Exploration into Pigou’s Theory of Cycles,” Journal
of Monetary Economics 51(6): 1183-1216
[3] (2007) “When can Changes in Expectations Cause Business Cycle Fluc-
tuations in Neo-classical Settings?” Journal of Economic Theory 127(1): 458-477.
[4] Blanchard, O. J. and J. Gali (2007, “The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Oil Shocks: Why are
the 2000s so Diﬀerent from the 1970s?”, NBER Working Paper No. 13368.
[5] Christiano, L., C. Ilut, R. Motto and M. Rostagno (2007) “Monetary Policy and Stock
Market Boom-Bust Cycle,” mimeo, Northwestern University.
[6] Elekdag, S., R. Lalonde, D. Laxton, D. Muir and P. Pesenti (2008), “Oil price movement
and the global economy: A Model-Based Assessment,” NBER Working Paper No. 13792.
[7] Erceg, C., L. Guerrieri, and C. Gust, (2006), “SIGMA: A new Open Economy Model for
Policy Analysis,” International Journal of Central Banking 2: 1-50.
[8] Faruqee, H., D. Laxton, D. Muir and P. Pesenti (2005): “Smooth landing or crash? Model-
Based scenarios of global current account rebalancing,” NBER Working Paper No. 11583.
[9] Jaimovich, N. and S. Rebelo (2006) “Can News About the Future Drive the Business
Cycle?” NBER Working Paper No. 12537.
16[10] Jaimovich, N. and S. Rebelo (2007) “News and Business Cycles in Open Economies,”
NBER Working Paper No. 13444.
[11] Marf´ an, M., J. P. Medina and C. Soto (2008), “Overoptimism, Boom-Bust Cycles and
Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies,” Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No.
510.
[12] Sanchez, M. (2008), “Oil Shocks and Endogenous Markups,” European Central Bank,
Workin Paper Series No. 860.
[13] Medina, J. P. (2009) “An´ alisis Internacional basado en un Modelo Simple para la Econom´ ıa
Global,” manuscript, Central Bank of Chile.
[14] Schmitt-Groh´ e, S. and M. Uribe (2003), “Closing Small Open Economy Models,” Journal
of International Economics 61, 163-185.
[15] Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2008), “What’s News in Business Cycles” NBER Working
Paper No. 14215.
17Figure 1: US Slowdown Driven by a Fall in Demand
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18Figure 2: US Slowdown Driven by a Fall in Productivity
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19Figure 3: US Slowdown Driven by a Fall in Demand with AS and RW Pegging to the US Dollar
US slowdown driven by a fall in demand; fixed exchange rate in AS and RW
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20Figure 4: US Slowdown Driven by a Fall in Productivity with AS and RW Pegging to the US
Dollar
US slowdown driven by a fall in productivity; fixed exchange rate in AS and RW
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22Figure 6: Global Boom-Bust Cycle with AS and RW Pegging to the US Dollar
Global Boom-Bust Cycle
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23Figure 7: Global Boom-Bust Cycle with AS and RW Pegging to the US Dollar and More Wage
Rigidity in US and EU
Global Boom-Bust Cycle












Europe & Japan Emerging Asia Rest of the World
Oil price  Copper price
US
Europe & Japan Emerging Asia Rest of the World
Europe & Japan Emerging Asia Rest of the World
Europe & Japan Emerging Asia Rest of the World
















































































































































































































1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
24Figure 8: Global Boom-Bust Cycle and Current Account Imbalances
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25Figure 9: Protectionism in US and EU through Subsidies
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26Figure 10: Protectionism in US and EU through Subsidies and Import Tariﬀs
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27A Some Statistics used for the Parameterization
Table 1: Production and Trade Data
Description United States Europe Asia Rest of the World
GDP share in total World
Average 2000-2007, PPP adjusted 20.2 15.5 25.2 39.1
Net Exports
Average 2000-2006, as percentage of GDP -5.5 -0.1 3.1 -1.4
Average 1980-2006, as percentage of GDP -3.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.8
Average 1960-2006, as percentage of GDP -1.3 - - -
Net Exports of Oil
Average 2000-2006, as percentage of GDP -1.4 -1.5 -5.0 4.5
Net Exports of Copper
Average 2000-2006, as percentage of GDP -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 0.5
Total Oil Consumption
Average 1980-2006, as percentage of GDP 2.4 3.6 8.3 2.5
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on data from World Economic Outlook, IFS, Direction of Trade Statistics, British Petroleum and
Cochilco
B Parameters for Calibration
Table 2: Production Function Parameters
Parameter Meaning US EU AS RW
θi,s Elasticity of Substitution of copper and the
other factors in gross production
0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500
θi,o Elasticity of Substitution of oil and the other
factors in gross production
0.1000 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000
αi,s Share of copper in gross production 0.0010 0.0010 0.0040 0.0001
αi,o Share of oil in gross production 0.0300 0.0300 0.0600 0.0300
αi,l Share of labor in gross production 0.9000 0.9000 0.9300 0.9000
28Table 3: Household Preference Parameters
Parameter Meaning US EU AS RW
hi Habit formation coeﬃcient 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
σi Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
σL,i Inverse of labor supply elasticity 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000
γus,i Share of produced goods in US aggregate
demand
0.8990 0.0400 0.0490 0.0101
γeu,i Share of produced goods in EU aggregate
demand
0.0490 0.8930 0.0530 0.0025
γas,i Share of produced goods in AS aggregate
demand
0.0490 0.0810 0.8130 0.0547
γrw,i Share of produced goods in RW aggregate
demand
0.0680 0.0590 0.0260 0.8456
λi Fraction of Non-Ricardian households 0.2000 0.2000 0.4000 0.4000
Table 4: Parameters Governing Nominal Rigidities and Monetary Policy
Parameter Meaning US EU AS RW
φp,i Calvo parameter of price rigidity 0.6600 0.6600 0.6600 0.6600
ξp,i Weight of price indexation to past inﬂation 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
φL,i Calvo parameter of wage rigidity 0.7500 0.7500 0.7500 0.7500
ξL,i Weight of wage indexation to past inﬂation 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000
ψrn,i Smoothing coeﬃcient in the Taylor-type rule
0.8000
0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
ψπ,i Reaction coeﬃcient to inﬂation in the Taylor-
type rule
2.0000 2.0000 1.2000 1.2000
ψy,i Reaction coeﬃcient to output in the Taylor-type
rule
0.1250 0.1250 0.1250 0.1250
ψ∆e,i Reaction coeﬃcient to exchange devaluation in
the Taylor-type rule
0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.2000
29Table 5: Trade Parameters
Parameter Meaning US EU AS RW
Xus,i/V Aus Exports from US to each region as percentage
of GDP
- 0.0500 0.0250 0.0570
Xeu,i/V Aeu Exports from EU to each region as percentage
of GDP
0.0400 - 0.0410 0.0500
Xas,i/V Aas Exports from AS to each region as percentage
of GDP
0.0990 0.1080 - 0.0440
Xrw,i/V Arw Exports from RW to each region as percentage
of GDP
0.0120 0.0030 0.0320 -
ηus,i Elasticity of substitution among goods in US
aggregate demand
1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
ηeu,i Elasticity of substitution among goods in EU
aggregate demand
1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
ηas,i Elasticity of substitution among goods in AS
aggregate demand
1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
ηrw,i Elasticity of substitution among goods in RW
aggregate demand
1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
(ζS,i − YS,i)/V Ai Net exports of copper as percentage of GDP -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0040 0.0049
(ζO,i − YO,i)/V Ai Net exports of oil as percentage of GDP -0.0250 -0.0250 -0.0640 0.0996
NXi/V Ai Total net exports as percentage of GDP 0.0060 -0.0020 -0.0040 -0.0024
B∗
i Net foreign asset position as percentage of GDP -0.6058 0.2020 0.4038 0.2424
V Ai/V A Output share in the global GDP 0.3000 0.3000 0.1500 0.2500
30Table 6: Currency of denomination of the exports from each region
Parameter Meaning US EU AS RW
Share of exports in US dollars
ν1,us,j Share of export from each region to US - 1.00 1.00 1.00
ν1,eu,j Share of export from each region to EU 0.00 - 0.00 0.00
ν1,as,j Share of export from each region to AS 0.00 0.00 - 1.00
ν1,rw,j Share of export from each region to RW 0.00 0.00 1.00 -
Share of exports in currency of EU (euros)
ν2,us,j Share of export from each region to US - 0.00 0.00 0.00
ν2,eu,j Share of export from each region to EU 1.00 - 1.00 1.00
ν2,as,j Share of export from each region to AS 0.00 0.00 - 0.00
ν2,rw,j Share of export from each region to RW 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Share of exports in currency of the producer
1 − ν1,us,j − ν2,us,j Share of export from each region to US - 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 − ν1,eu,j − ν2,eu,j Share of export from each region to EU 0.00 - 0.00 0.00
1 − ν1,as,j − ν2,as,j Share of export from each region to AS 1.00 1.00 - 0.00
1 − ν1,rw,j − ν2,rw,j Share of export from each region to RW 1.00 1.00 0.00 -
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